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RESPONSES
Response-The Honorable Lindsay G. Arthur*
What makes Judges Judge?
Then to the rolling Heav'n itself I cried,
Asking, 'What Lamp had Destiny to guide
Her little Children stumbling in the Dark?'
And. . . 'A blind Understanding!' Heaven replied.'
Judges are reasonably complex and more or less human, maybe
almost as much so as other people: "If you prick us, do we not bleed? If
you tickle us do we not laiigh?' ' 2 We do not react simply to one course of
indoctrination, we also have stomach aches; nor do we in splendid
isolation balance equities, we also see people; nor are we concerned only
with sustaining a judicial myth or finding in every decision its natural
law or abiding smugly in our own superior morality: we also simply live,
we also reflect our environments and our ancestors and our newspapers
and all the people who talk to us and all the people who don't. For better
or for worse, we cannot be dissected with a dull knife nor analyzed from
a single premise. Even the best of sociological research may miss some
factor of us; while sociologists are never simply blind men, neither are we
simply elephants to be fully defined by the touch of our flank.
I.
Judges have psyches in the sense that each has a "mind functioning as
the center of thought, feeling and behavior, and consciously or
unconsciously adjusting and relating the body to its social and physical
environment."' 3 We have families: teen age daughters who talk to us
about Beatles and sons who try not to mention hair. We have wives we
get displeased with and homes with leaky roofs and neighbors with
barking dogs and lovely martinis. All these, perforce, have impact,
maybe more than our concepts of Congress or history. Maybe these are
all part of Professor Skogan's "social and cultural milieu that forms the
environment which shapes learning,' 4 but somehow a barking dog or a
pulling child doesn't seem very cultural and, whatever their impact on a
* Judge, Juvenile Division-District Court, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
1. Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam, No. 33.
2. Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice, Act Ill, Scene 1.
3. THE AMRICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1055 (1969).
4. Skogan, Judicial Myth and Judicial Reality at 309, 312 supra.
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judge who has fretted with them through a night, their sociological
evaluation must almost defy measurement.
Judges belong to clubs and meet friends and listen to the chatter of the
day. They play squash and get hit in the head by a fast ball and then go
back to Court to decide a case. They see pretty girls, or get splashed by
cars too close to the curb, or feel the warmth of the sun. They read books
and escape with television and clean up after cats . . . and all of these
make judges judge.
And they put on the robe! Whatever they were before, they are less so
when the robe inducts them into an establishment. If they were poor,
they suddenly are a little above average. If they were outside, they're
inside. A pedestal, very small but a pedestal, is slipped under their clay
feet and in some measure they are less a reflection of their individual
heritage. Possibly, this mystical experience can explain Professor
Skogan's report that "Among the judges themselves, we found a
consistently high level of agreement on all items. . . .This consensus is
especially striking because the socializing influence to which the judges
were exposed was by no means homogeneous." 5 It is a real force, this
robe; it should be taken into the equation. In 1960, the Minneapolis
Municipal Court used some 38 lawyers for a week apiece to assist in
reducing a case backlog: to a man, and without prompting, they
acknowledged this impact of the robe.
II.
Judges have philosophies in the sense that each has a "system of
motivating concepts or principles". 6 Each of the judicial classifications
noted by Grossman and Sarat: law-interpreters, law-makers, or
pragmatists, 7 or the tendency to establish criteria independent of statute
as noted by Fahey,' all can readily be found in any multi-judge court; it
is well that the sociologists note their impact. For surely a judge's
motives in wanting to be and being a judge will affect his judging. He
may wish to be a Coke or a Holmes and open new vistas of law, or a
Marshall who builds the judiciary's power, or a Warren who uses it. Or
he may like the niceties of a well run legal encounter or a
particularization of an obtuse point. Or he may just like a job with
5. Id. 332 supra.
6. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 985 (1969).
7. Grossman & Sarat, Political Culture and Judicial Research at 177, 195-96 supra.
8. Fahey, The Enforcement of the Illinois Felon Marijuana Law in Chicago at 281, 298 supra.
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security, status, and pension. Whatever his motives, as with his
particular judicial and political concepts, his judging will reflect them
...and, worse, if a judge who would be a law-maker is assigned cases
involving only law-interpretation, his judging will reflect this also, just as
surgeons and psychiatrists would do poorly in the other's cases even
though both are physicians.
III.
Judges have politics. It's been well and cynically said that the only
prerequisite to becoming a judge is to know the Governor. Professor
Cook says the same more-delicately: "The lawyer anxious for a judicial
position prepares himself in various ways for the eventuality. He may
shape his legal and political career more in respect to the recruitment
requirements to the judicial office than the role expectations for its
occupancy."' But in the American system of checks and balances, was
ist los? President Roosevelt, after his epic struggle with an adverse court,
surely felt that he was expressing the will of the people and not mere
politics by appointing men of his own political persuasion to diffuse a
court dominated by his opponents. Political politics determines
appointments but even in state courts where judges are elected, a
different and peculiar kind of politics controls continuance in power. A
judge's decisions have little impact on his reelection since, as Grossman
and Sarat state, "Most citizens do not know enough about the Courts to
have any opinion" 10 and, as Skogan succinctly put it, ". . . the public is
not concerned with the content of [a judges'] decisions . . .[but with]
the importance of personal characteristics: honesty, humility,
objectivity, and human sympathy."" And maybe the public, as usual, is
right: Justice Cardozo said "In the long run there is no guarantee of
justice except the personality of the judge."
The strength of the bar, particularly in reelection contests, cannot be
overlooked, either by the sociologists or by judges contemplating
reelection contests. It is generally recognized that the public looks to its
lawyers for guidance in judicial selections . . .far more than do
Governors or Senators. It is a mark for a profession needing marks that
the bar generally supports objective, intelligent, working judges over
9. Cook, The Socialization of New Federal Judges: Impact on District Court Business at 253,
254-55 supra.
10. Grossman & Sarat, Political Culture and Judicial Research at 177, 203 supra.
11. Skogan, Judicial Myth and Judicial Reality at 309, 332 supra.
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judges who kowtow to the lawyers .. .though maybe it is still self-
interest: if I can win a case today because the judge fears my clout, I may
lose a bigger one tomorrow when that judge fears tomorrow's
adversary's greater clout. At any rate, in Minnesota, where a secret poll
is taken of all lawyers in a district where there is a judicial contest, for a
century, the public has followed the results of the poll in almost one
hundred per cent of the elections! And this whether the poll supports the
incumbent or the challenger.
Judges, or someone in their behalf, must become involved in politics if
they want their salaries to increase. The setting of judicial salaries is
political and, of necessity in an economy of steadily rising prices,
involves judges in politics merely to retain their standard of living. It's
one of the murkier aspects of our democracy that salaries of public
officials have to be set by . . .public officials, without the intercession
or even the advice of non-affected persons. And judges quickly learn that
theirs is not an isolated branch of government: if judges' salaries are
raised, so must governors' and sheriffs' and attorneys' general . . . and
legislators'. The public damns adequate salaries, and damns inadequate
officials.
IV.
Judges have preparation for their positions, but the quality of it varies,
radically. Professor Cook's article well describes the "by guess and by
God" methods usually applied: by the clerks and court reporters, by
other judges if they have time, by the chief judge, if there is one and he is
so inclined, or merely, as the Professor puts it "by the technique of the
old-fashioned swimming lesson."'" In my own case, I was more
fortunate than most: I was able to sit with another judge for a week;
since he was on petty crimes assignment that week, I acquired at least a
passing recognition of procedures and one other judge's sentencing
philosophies . . . in petty crimes.
The need for structured training of judges, both by way of
indoctrination of new judges and in-service training of sitting judges, is
an elemental priority. No program of judicial training should be started
or carried on without reading Professor Cook's article.' 3 Colleges for
Trial Judges and Juvenile Court Judges are in their early stages at the
12. Cook, The Socialization of New Federal Judges: Impact on District Court Business at 253
supra.
13. Id.
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University of Nevada on grant from the Fleischmann Foundation, but
they are yet formative. The failures of the federal seminars: emphasis on
civil rather than both civil and criminal and too narrow a selection of
problem areas included in the curricula1 4 and their successes: teaching
new tools of judicial administration15 and judicial motives 1 , should give
guidance to others who are launching on programs of judicial training.
Certainly the easiest, the democratically safest, and the most effective
way to improve the judiciary is through structured indoctrination and
on-going training. Changing the methods of selecting judges is probably
undesirable and maybe impossible in a politicized democracy.
Controlling judges is dangerous because of the obvious and immediate
advantages of abuse. Training is effective, wanted, and possible.
Professor Cook established guidelines.
V.
Judges have preferences; but mostly it's coincidental if they can
pursue them. Assignments are rotated: in large courts by judges going
from one type case to another type every month, or quarter, or year,
whether they want to or not; in small courts by the natural variety of
cases itself determining a change in type from case to case whether the
judge wants to or not. Yet judges usually have one or two types of cases
which they can hear better than others. The modern trend towards a
single, consolidated trial court, highly desirable for administrative
efficiency, exacerbates the inability of a particular judge to become
expert in a field of his choice and to stay with that expertise since the
consolidated mass-court, particularly in metropolitan areas, places the
assignment power in a senior and often remote Chief Judge. . . who is
human and therefore enjoys power. In analyzing a judge's judging,
among all the other influences: does he want the particular assignment?
His preferences will, because he also is human, affect his willingness to
learn, to participate, to politicize.
VI.
Judges have pronouncements which constrict them. Trial judges are
bound by appellate decisions, and not because these are necessarily wise
14. Id. 269-270.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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but because the need for uniformity and predictability of law in all cases
is usually deemed more important than the need for niceties of wisdom in
a particular case. People need to know what the law is and thus they need
to know that what was the law in a given situation yesterday will be the
law in the same situation tomorrow, unless it is quite demonstrably
wrong in tomorrow's world, so that they can gear their conduct
accordingly. So courts are constricted by Holmes' "dead hand of the
past", and this constriction has its impact which sociological analyses
must note.
And courts, even from their ivory towers, must regard public
attitudes. Professor Grossman considers courts to be undemocratic in
their non-responsiveness, 17 as though they were some un-blooded
machines that gave automatic print-outs. But judges are not, and should
not be un-public. They read newspapers and sense public attitudes. The:
are not unaware of the need to preserve the judicial myth." Juvenile
Court judges across the country are quite aware that four of their
number, all superior in ability, were defeated in the 1970 elections for
being more concerned with treating children than with punishing them.
Judges are not unaware that economic issues have more immediate
impact than libertarian or ideological objectives. 19
Some courts even conceive there to be a "natural law" applicable to
all cultures in all ages, possibly of divine origin which, if found,
supercedes all laws, precedents, constitutions, politics, or public wishes.2"
Aside from theological considerations, such a concept is greatly
undemocratic, unless it be also assumed that the will of the demos is
itself divinely inspired. The concept has less present adherence, but it
must be regarded in any study of influences of judicial decision. In
studying how a particular seed grows, you cannot consider only the
amount of sunlight it receives, the direction of the winds, or the effect of
big trees around it, or any one factor: it is a product of all of them. All
judges have been exposed to the concept of Natural Law. It has had its
impact. Maybe it should have more.
17. Grossman & Sarat, Political Culture and Judicial Research at 177, 206 supra.
18. Skogan, Judicial Myth and Judicial Reality at 309 supra.
19. Schmidhauser, Berg & Melone, The Impact of Judicial Decisions: New Dimensions in the
Supreme Court-Congressional Relations, 1945-1968 at 209, 235 supra.
20. Skogan, Judicial Myth and Judicial Reality at 309, 313 supra.
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VII.
Judges have procedures; and it is well they do. With all the great
philosophical and human pressures that are put upon a judge .. and
often it is necessary to decide against these . . a case is, and in justice
must be, decided according to the reliable and pertinent evidence
produced. However bad a person may seem in the newpapers, his
conviction will depend on evidence, as weighed by jurors, not by
reporters, or television viewers, or sociologists, or politicians, or judges.
Courts are constrained by their rules and thus emotions are constrained
and .. .to the extent that such is ever possible .. .laws, not men,
govern particular situations. Men collectively should surely govern the
law, but laws collectively should as surely govern the man.21
The production and presentation of evidence is a function of humans,
and so it will never be of equal competence or completeness in any two
cases. Lawyers too are human, some are more skillful than others, some
are more skillful on a particular day than others are on that same day.
Some have better staff work behind them. Some have more money to
spend. And most who are publicly employed, whether as public
prosecutors or public defenders, are given too little compensation for
motivation and too little time for preparation. 21 Judicial decisions must
be analyzed in the light of evidence, and this is beyond the control of
judges; its measurement may be beyond the control of sociologists, yet it
may still be the most important reason why a judge judges a particular
case.
There is a new form of evidence: the expert analysis. It is a field that
cannot help but grow as society's complexities grow. The law says that
experts may only analyze the facts in court when it is beyond the ken of
the average juror to make his own analysis. With all of the new
._.ologies" impacting upon us, and with the increasing fervor of
Americans to sue professionals for allegedly careless professing, there
will certainly be an increase in the complexity of our litigation, requiring
the assistance of experts in order to educate the jury and court as to the
meaning of particular facts in a particular case. Professor Burnham
amply demonstrates the importance of the political scientist in voter
registration cases. 23 Similarly other disciplines, heretofore confined
21. Fahey, The Enforcement of the Illinois Felony Marijuana Law in Chicago at 281 supra.
22. Id. 297.
23. Burnham, A Political Scientist and Voting-Rights Litigation: The Case of the 1966 Texas
Registration Statute at 335 supra.
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within ivy, are sure to enter the judicial crucible and thus similarly to
have their impact on how judges judge. The oldest of limitations, money,
will unfortunately be of major importance: someone must pay for an
expert from the East to testify in the West, if only his airplane ticket or,
if by deposition, the lawyers' airplane tickets. Only great causes can
afford great experts.
VIII.
And lastly . . . maybe it should be firstly . .. judges have
personalities. They have prejudices and stomach aches and pride and
stalled cars and inspirations and hangovers and far visions and sore
feet. All judges try, and most succeed in reducing the impact of
"gastronomical jurisprudence", 4 but few reduce its effect to zero.
For after all judges are. . . thanks be to Heaven . . . human. They
are not computers controlled by always knowable inputs. Neither are
they scientists indifferently imposing inexorable rules. They are only
humans, judging only humans, hopefully themselves in turn to be
similarly judged.
Response-Werner F. Grunbaum*
What subject indeed is so vast as the law of the State? But what is so
trivial as the task of those who give legal advice? . . . Now all this
amounts to little so far as learning is concerned, though for practical
purposes it is indespensable.
Cicero, Laws I. iv. 14
The courts, legal practitioners and the academicians who study them
are influenced by and react to the climate of opinion and events around
them. Sometimes they tend to react rapidly. Other times they tend to
resist change. But they vannot excape the influence of their environment.
Recently, legal practitioners have emphasized such activities as
consumer lawyering and legal aid. Law school academics thus
responded' both to the world around them and to those young law
24. Skogan, Judicial Myth and Judicial Reality at - - infra.
* Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri-St. Louis.
1. See, e.g., The Law Schools and the Minority Group Law Students, A survey for the A.A.L.S.
Committee on Minority Groups, 1970 AALS PROCEEDINGS 9-91.
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